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Abstract. This paper presents the logical treatment of imperatives (commands and promises)
regarded as actions one rational agent performs in order to compel the other rational agent,
by imposing certain obligations on her, to act in a certain way. To talk about the embed-
ded stit-formulas that represent such imperative actions the framework of stit-logic supplied
with the ©-operator, as it is introduced by J. Horty, is used. We investigate some curious
technical details of using the ©-operator ranging over the set of agents along with differ-
ent stit-operators and suggest formulas picturing some properties typical for the usage of
commands and promises. We establish several theorems and propositions expressing essen-
tial principles of imperative agency and show that these principles differ substantially from
their analogs in propositional logic and standard deontic logic (SDL). Finally, we briefly
discuss the possibilities of further investigation that embodies such issues as expressing the
imperative permission and prevalent embedded imperatives in the given framework.
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Аннотация. В статье представлен логический подход к императивам (командам и обе-
щаниям), которые трактуются как действия одного рационального агента, направлен-
ные на то, чтобы побудить другого рационального агента, посредством связывания
его обязательствами определенного рода, к совершению некоторого поступка. Для то-
го, чтобы иметь возможность интерпретировать формулы с вложенными агентными
операторами, которые отражают таким образом понимаемые императивы, использу-
ется STIT-логика, дополненная деонтическим оператором «О» хортиевского типа. В
статье исследуется ряд любопытных технических деталей, связанных с использованием
деонтического оператора в рамках логики действия совместно с различными агентны-
ми операторами, и предлагаются формулы, отражающие характеристические свойства
использования команд и обещаний. Мы формулируем несколько теорем и наблюдений,
отражающих существенные свойства употребления императивов, и показываем, что
между ними и сходными с ними утверждениями из пропозициональной и стандартной
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деонтической логики отсутствует параллелизм. В заключении мы кратко обсуждаем
перспективы будущих исследований в этой области, касающихся представления им-
перативного разрешения и широко рапространенных вложенных императивных дей-
ствий.
Ключевые слова: STIT-логика, логика действий, агентность, императив, обязательство.
Motivation
Only few philosophers and an even fewer number of logicians focus their atten-
tion on imperative sentences. Probably the most famous contribution was made
by J. L. Austin in his studies on commands, promises, requests and other types
of speech acts (Austin 1975). Foundations of illocutionary logic that were pre-
sented in the treatise of the same title by J. R. Searle and D. Vanderveken (Searle,
Vanderveken 1985), almost 25 years after Austin, deserve less recognition. Sev-
eral attempts to revive interest to imperatives have been made recently (see papers
(Vranas 2008), (Kearns 2006) and (Parsons 2013)).
However, imperatives play a great role in our communication activity, and logic
should say something about this fact. Just in the same way it says a lot of es-
sential things about declaratives. Being more specific, we believe that logic should
establish some rules that govern the usage of imperatives, above all—the usage of
commands and promises, since these types of imperatives are the prevaling subjects
of controversy in a great many of situations, starting from some ethical questions
and ending with argumentation that each of us uses permanently.
Since it is quite natural to consider commands and promises as actions that
agents perform in order to impel other agents to act in a certain way, we can state
that in order to contribute to the study of imperatives logic needs to learn how to
speak about these kinds of actions. Fortunately, logic has already known it, and we
have a lot of logic of actions at our disposal. What we need now is to choose one of
them and adopt its language for expressing actions of commands and promises.
Stit-logic or the logic of seeing-to-it-that is mostly known from the series of works
published in quantity by N. Belnap, M. Perloff and M. Xu in the period from 1991
to 1995, looks quite attractive as a basis for the formal study of imperative actions.
And it is definitely so, since the action of a command or a promise can be grasped
rather naturally at first glance by means of its main formula
[α sees to it that : φ], (1)
where α stands for an agent, and φ stands for a particular situation that α guarantees
to be the case, as it was first mentioned by Perloff in (Perloff 1995). A more precise
way of picturing an imperative, which generally includes a pair of agents, might be
this:
[α sees to it that : [β sees to it that : φ]]. (2)
What follows investigates this proposal in a formal way using the language and
the branching time semantics (BTS) of stit-logic.
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The article consists of six sections. Section 1 provides a brief explanation of the
basic formal tools that are used in the analysis. Those who are familiar with articles
on stit-logic can skip it. Section 2 introduces and explains the main difficulty of
applying the machinery of stit-logic to imperatives and overviews some possible
solutions. Here the main formula for picturing imperatives is introduced and some
preparatory semantic considerations are stated. The next three sections contain
proofs of some theses which express the essential logical features of commands and
promises and give answers to some old puzzles of imperative logic: Section 3 speaks
mainly on commands—here the refraining principle with respect to command is
established, and some divergence between imperative logic with ©-operator and
Standard Deontic Logic is elicited; in Section the 4 indexed©-operator is introduced
and its expressive power in the case of promises is demonstrated; in Section 5
the question of complex imperatives is raised over again and is answered from the
perspective elaborated in the article. The last Section 6 shows some perspectives
for the future investigations of imperative actions.
1 The basic language L of stit-logic and the BTS
Definition 1.1 (language L of stit-logic). Let Φ be the set of proposition letters p,
q, r, . . ., and Γ be the set of agent terms α, β, γ, …Well-formed formulas φ are
formed in accordance with the following rule:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 3φ | [α astit : φ] | [α dstit : φ],
where p ranges over elements of Φ, and α ranges over elements of Γ.
Here 3 serves as an analog for Poss-operator, which designates historical possi-
bility. The historical necessity operator  (in stit-theory “Sett” is sometimes used)
is dual for 3 as usual.
Definition 1.2 (frame S). A frame S for the language L is a tuple 〈T,≤,Γ,Choice〉,
where T is a nonempty set of moments m1,m2, . . . ,mn; ≤ is a partial order on T;
Γ is a set of agents α, β, γ, …; Choice is a function such that for each agent α ∈ Γ
and for each moment m ∈ T, Choiceαm is the set of possible choices available to α
at m.
A history h ∈ T is a maximal set of moments ordered linearly. H(m) is a set of
histories passing through m, and thus Choiceαm is a partition of H(m). Choiceαm(h) ∈
Choiceαm is a particular choice that α does inm.3 All histories that are in Choiceαm(h)
are called choice-equivalent histories for α at m. If h1 and h2 are in Choiceαm(h) we
write that h1 ≡αm h2. T can be regarded as the set of sets i1, i2, . . . , in of moments
called instants, where for every moments m ∪ m′ ∈ i, m  m′ and m′  m. If
m1 ∪ m2 ∈ i, m1 ∈ h1 and m2 ∈ h2, and h1 ≡αm h2, then m1 and m2 are choice-
equivalent moments for α at m. i(m) designates instant that contains moment m. If
3Sometimes we designate such particular choice-cell as K1,K2, . . . ,Kn following Horty’s nota-
tion.
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 201
Gleb Karpov. What Ought to Be Done for Imperative Logic
some histories h1 and h2 are undivided at some moment m (which means that there
is a moment m′ ∈ h1 ∪h2 such that m < m′) then there is no choice between h1 and
h2 for any agent at m.
Definition 1.3 (modelM). A modelM for the language L is a tuple 〈S, v〉, where
S is a frame for the language L, and v is a function that assigns values to atomic
formulas in each index m/h.
M,m/h |= p iff m/h ∈ v(p).
M,m/h |= ¬φ iff M,m/h 2 φ.
M,m/h |= φ ∧ φ iff M,m/h |= φ and M,m/h |= φ.
M,m/h |= 3φ iff M,m/h1 |= φ for some h1 ∈ H(m).
M,m/h |= [α astit : φ] iff there is a moment w < m such thatM,m1/h1 |= φ for
every m1 ≡αw m and every h1 ∈ H(m1) (the positive condition), and M,m2/h2 2 φ
for some m2 ∈ i(m) and for some h2 ∈ H(m2) (the negative condition).
M,m/h |= [α dstit : φ] iff M,m/h′ |= φ for every h′ ∈ Choiceαm(h) (the positive
condition); and M,m/h′′ 2 φ for some h′′ ∈ H(m) (the negative condition).
We say that a formula [α astit : φ] is settled true at m (M,m |= [α astit : φ])
iff M,m/h |= [α astit : φ] for every h ∈ H(m). A formula [α astit : φ] is valid in
M (M |= [α astit : φ]) iff M,m |= [α astit : φ] for every m from M. A formula
[α astit : φ] is valid in S (S |= [α astit : φ]) iff M |= [α astit : φ] for every M. A
formula [α astit : φ] is valid (|= [α astit : φ]) iff S |= [α astit : φ].
The same holds with respect to formulas with dstit-operator, except the fact
that dstit-formulas cannot be settled true: M,m 2 [α dstit : φ], since the opposite
contradicts the negative condition for dstit-formula from the definition 1.3.
As usual an arbitrary formula φ is satisfiable if there is a modelM and an index
m/h such that M,m/h |= φ.
2 Stit-theory offers the problem
Since the language L allows nesting we could try to capture formally the proposal
contained in expression 2. However the nested stit-formula that engages astit- and
dstit-operators turns out to be unsatisfiable.
Proposition 2.1. M,m/h 2 [α astit : [β dstit : φ]] for every model M and every
index m/h.
Proof. Suppose there is an arbitrary model M and an arbitrary index m/h such
that M,m/h |= [α astit : [β dstit : φ]]. Then there is a moment w < m such that
both positive and negative requirements for [α astit : [β dstit : φ]] are fulfilled. Then,
in particular, M,m1/h1 |= [β dstit : φ] for every m1 ≡αw m and every h1 ∈ H(m1).
This means that the negative condition for [β dstit : φ] cannot be fulfilled, since if it
is the case, then there would be an index m1/h′1 2 φ, and M,m1/h1 |= [β dstit : φ]
can no longer hold.
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The semantics of stit-theory puts constraints on nested stit-formulas, and to
express actions of commands and promises in L we should somehow evade this
constraints. This difficulty was familiar to Belnap’s team: in their joint proceeding
(Belnap, Perloff, Xu, 2001) (especially Ch. 4 and Ch. 12) we can find a number of its
possible solutions, though presented mostly in an informal manner and in a general
way. On the whole these proposals come to an idea of some complement that should
be introduced to the nested stit-formula and thus prevent its self-contradictoriness.
The most popular types of complements were these:
• deontic ([α stit : Obligatory [β stit : φ]], [α stit : Permissible [β stit : φ]]);4
• modal auxiliary verbs ([α stit : Should [β stit : φ]], etc.);
• illocutionary complement ([α stit : Advises [β stit : φ]],
[α stit : Orders [β stit : φ]]).5
We find the idea of using deontic operators wedging into nested stit-formulas
quite attractive. Not only may it preserve the acceptability of the view on impera-
tives as actions that produce other actions, but also because it explicates the fact
that imperatives issued deontically influence the engaged agents. The last thing
agrees with CUGO- and PUGO-principles introduced in (Yamada 2008), which say
respectively that Commands Usually Generate Obligations and Promises Usually
Generate Obligations. In accordance with this we state that
[α stit : Obligatory [β stit : φ]] (3)
pictures the situation that when agent α performs an action of a command and
addresses it to agent β, α thereby creates an obligation, which is either fulfilled or
not fulfilled by β’s future course of action. The following study of logical properties
of formula 3 and formulas that can be obtained from it through common formation
rules is of course on no account the direct study of imperatives, but rather it is the
study of deontic effects of imperative sentences regarded as actions, maybe the most
important type of effect the actions of commands and promises have.
2.1 Nested Stit-formulas with ought-operator
Though we do not find the formal treatment of formulas like
[α stit : Obligatory [β stit : φ]]
in (Belnap, Perloff, Xu, 2001), we can still find the semantic rules for its complement
in the earlier proceeding (Horty, Belnap 1995). There the impersonal ought to be-
operator “©” and dstit-operator are regarded as a unit so that it becomes possible
4From this point onwards we use “stit” as a generic term for operators astit and dstit.
5It is worth mentioning that even the introduction of the historical possibility operator 3
to the nested stit-formula preserves it from being self-contradictory, although it does not make
[α stit : 3[β stit : φ]] a relevant picture of a command or request.
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to express in terms of stit-theory such deontic notion as personal ought to do. Then
the formula
© [α dstit : φ] (4)
pictures the fact that agent α ought to see to it that φ, or that agent α is obligated
to see to it that φ.
In order to provide the semantics for formula 4 the frame S is extended in the
following way:
Definition 2.2 (extended frame S+). An extended frame S+ for the language L+ is
a tuple S+ = 〈T,≤,Γ, Choice, Ought〉, where T, ≤, Γ and Choice are defined as in
the definition 1.2, and where Ought stands for the function mapping each moment
m into the set Ought(m) ∈ Hm of ideal histories passing through moment m.
The language L+ is obtained from the language L by adding “©φ” to the set of
well-formed formulas. An ideal history h⋆ ∈ Ought(m) represents the future course
of an action that is ideal with respect to momentm, in accordance with the intuition
that an ideal is something that ought to be the case.6
Definition 2.3. Truth of ©φ in M at m/h is defined as follows:
M,m/h |=©φ iff M,m/h⋆ |= φ for each h⋆ ∈ Ought(m).
Thus the formula
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]], (5)
that in contrast to formula 2 bears no contradiction, can admittedly express what
happens on the deontic level of an agent’s interaction when α utters an imperative
sentence, and β receives what was uttered and finds herself in a situation when it
is obligatory to choose between some set of alternatives.
Proposition 2.4. Formula 5 is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose m/h is a moment/history index in a model
M = 〈T,≤ Γ, Choice, Ought〉.
Then the formula [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] is satisfiable in M at m/h iff there is a
moment w < m such that:
1. M,m1/h1 |=©[β dstit : φ] for every moment m1 ≡αw m and for every history
h1 ∈ H(m1), and
2. M,m2/h2 2©[β dstit : φ] for some moment m2 ∈ i(m) such that w < m2 and for
some h2 ∈ H(m2).7
6For more details see Chapter 3 in (Horty 2001).
7This particular quantification deserves special attention. On the basis of definition 1.3 “some”
is expected here, but when the subformula of the formula that occurs in the “negative” choice-cell
contains ought-operator something changes, as it is not possible for formulas of kind “©φ” to satisfy
at some history h and do not satisfy at some history h′, where h and h′ belong to the same moment
m. In other words formulas like “©φ” are either settled true or settled false at some moment. That
is why in the situations like in point 2 of the given proof we may intrepidly switch from “some” to
“every”.
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Using clause 1 we get:
3. M,m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : φ] for every h1 ∈ H(m1) iff M,m1/h⋆1 |= [β dstit : φ] for
every h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1).
4. M,m1/h⋆1 |= [β dstit : φ] for every h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1) iff M,m1/h3 |= φ for every
h3 ∈ Choiceβm1(h⋆1), and M,m1/h4 2 φ for some h4 ∈ H(m1).
Using clause 2 we get:
5. M,m2/h2 2 ©[β dstit : φ] for some h2 ∈ H(m2) iff M,m2/h⋆2 2 [β dstit : φ], for
some h⋆2 ∈ Ought(m2).
6. M,m2/h⋆2 2 [β dstit : φ], for some h⋆2 ∈ Ought(m2) iff either M,m2/h5 2 φ for
some h5 ∈ Choiceβm2(h⋆2), or M,m2/h6 |= φ for every h6 ∈ H(m2).
Since there is no contradiction within the set of clauses 1-6 this completes the proof
of Proposition 2.4.
Observe that agent β bears no possibility to escape from being obligated to seeing
to it that φ if agent α performs an imperative and causes the deontic situation that is
captured with the help of formula 5. But nevertheless agent β can still escape from
seeing to it that φ: to the first approximation β can choose some h′3 /∈ Choiceβm1(h⋆1)
such that M,m1/h′3 |= ¬φ. Naturally, formula ¬φ being true at m1/h′3 does not
make ©[β dstit : φ] false either at index m1/h1, or at any other moment choice-
equivalent to moment m with respect to α’s choice she does at moment w.
This intuition can be expressed in a stricter way since we have a formula of the
kind
[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] (6)
at our disposal that represents the fact of β’s refraining from seeing to it that φ.8
We argue that the fact of issuing an imperative (namely a command) that creates
the deontic situation which can be captured with formula 5, is compatible with the
fact of refraining from doing what was commanded. Take notice that the same is
not correct for the pair of formulas 2 and 6.
Proposition 2.5. The conjunction of formulas
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] and [β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]]
is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose again that m/h is a moment/history index in a model M = 〈T,≤
,Γ, Choice, Ought〉. Then [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] and [β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] are
consistent withinM. The calculation for the former formula in the given assertion
goes just in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2.4, so that we have the
following three preconditions 1∗–3∗:
8For the reference on the refraining formula that expresses agentive not seeing to it that φ, see
Section 4.3 in (Horty, Belnap 1995).
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1.∗ M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]];
2.∗ M,m |=©[β dstit : φ];9
3.∗ M,m/h⋆ |= [β dstit : φ], for h⋆ ∈ Ought(m).
Suppose that [β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] holds inM at m/h. Then, in accordance with
the truth definition for dstit-formulas, we have the following facts:
4. M,m/h′ |= ¬[β dstit : φ] for every h′ ∈ Choiceβm(h);
5. M,m/h′′ |= [β dstit : φ] for some h′′ ∈ H(m).
It can be the case that histories h⋆ and h belong to different choice-cells, which
makes formulas [α astit : ©[β dstit : φ]] and [β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] consistent within
the model M.
Here is the justification of the fact of using astit-operator as the major device
for capturing imperatives instead of cstit or dstit that are used most frequently. We
proceed with two arguments. First of all the usage of the formula
[α dstit : © [β dstit : φ]] (7)
is simply impossible because of the contradiction it reveals.
Proposition 2.6. Formula 7 is not satisfiable.
Proof. Assume the opposite: then there is some model M and index m/h such
that: M,m/h |= [α dstit : © [β dstit : φ]]. It is the case when the positive and the
negative conditions for the initial formula are fulfilled. Then we have:
1. M,m/h′ |=©[β dstit : φ] for every history h′ ∈ Choiceαm(h);
2. M,m/h′′ |= ¬© [β dstit : φ] for some history h′′ ∈ H(m).
From the first clause we can derive that M,m/h⋆ |= [β dstit : φ] for every h⋆ ∈
Ought(m); from the second clause we can derive that M,m/h⋆ |= ¬[β dstit : φ] for
some history h⋆ ∈ Ought(m) and get the contradiction.
Secondly, using astit seems to be natural with respect to the interaction of a
pair of agents: each of them needs a moment, where she makes choice, and the basic
framework for astit grants at our disposal moments w and m1, . . . , mn, where w
is a choice-moment for one agent and m1, . . . ,mn are choice-moments for the other
agent.10 In contrast to this engaging feature of astit, cstit works with one single
9Since clause 1∗ holds in particular if ©[β dstit : φ] holds in M at m1/h1 for every m1 ≡αw m
and for every h1 ∈ H(m1), we have ©[β dstit : φ] settled true at every m1 ≡αw m. As the choice-
equivalence relation is symmetric, we can state that ©[β dstit : φ] is settled true at m also—this is
the content of clause 2∗.
10In Propositions 2.1, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 we implicitly consider the moment w to be the choice-
moment only for the agent α, and moments m1, . . . ,mn to be choice-moments only for the agent β.
We will be consistent with this constraint in the subsequent text.
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choice-moment, and in order to get another one for the second agent we need to
make some transformations of the given framework for cstit, which finally gives us
almost the same framework (with the exception of the “negative” choice-cell and
“negative” histories) as we already have for astit.
3 Validities and invalidities
Proposition 2.5 suggests an idea of the following formula
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]→ 3[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]], (8)
which says that whenever agent α issues a command that changes the deontic sit-
uation for β in such a way that β now is obligated to see to it that φ, β then has
an ability to refrain from seeing to it that φ. This ability is pictured with the help
of 3[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] in accordance with what is proposed in (Horty, Belnap
1995: 606).
Theorem 3.1. Formula 8 is valid.
Proof. Assume that formula 8 is not valid. ThenM,m/h |= [α astit : ©[β dstit : φ]]∧
¬3[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] for some model M and some index m/h.
Then:
1. M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] and
2. M,m/h |= ¬3[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]].
Again the positive truth condition for the formula from clause 1 says that
©[β dstit : φ] is settled true in M at m; which means that there must be an ideal
history h⋆ ∈ Ought(m) such that [β dstit : φ] satisfies in M at m/h⋆. Note that
there must be a history h′ that makes the negative condition for [β dstit : φ] holds:
M,m/h′ |= ¬φ for some h′ ∈ H(m).
Clause 2 says that it is not possible for agent β to refrain from seeing to it
that φ, and so we can state that in every history that passes through m formula
¬[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] must hold. In particular it must hold in h′:
M,m/h′ |= ¬[β dstit : ¬[β dstit : φ]] iff either M,m/h′′ |= [β dstit : φ] for some
h′′ ∈ Choiceβm(h′) (i), or M,m/h′′′ |= ¬[β dstit : φ] for every h′′′ ∈ H(m) (ii).
Since histories h′ and h′′ are in the same choice-cell, the alternative (i) contradicts
the fact that M,m/h′ |= ¬φ for some h′ ∈ H(m).
The alternative (ii) contradicts the statement that ©[β dstit : φ] is settled true
at m: If we accept it, we get no possibility to state that there is an ideal history h⋆,
where [β dstit : φ] holds.
Formula 5 reveals fairly unexpected results when it is substituted into the the-
orem of the standard deontic logic ©(φ ∧ ψ) ↔ (©φ ∧ ©ψ). When we substi-
tute the impersonal ought-to-be operator “©” with personal ought-to-do operator
“©[β dstit : φ]” connected with the astit, it might be the case that
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[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])]↔
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]. (9)
However in stit-theory, as it is shown in (Belnap 1991: 795), it is not valid that
[α astit : φ ∧ ψ]→ [α astit : φ] ∧ [α astit : ψ],
and because of that we can presumably state that while formula:
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]]→
[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])] (10)
might be valid or at least satisfying, formula
[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])]→
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] (11)
most likely is not valid.
Theorem 3.2. Formula 10 is valid.
Proof. 1. Assume that formula 10 is not satisfied at some index m/h in some model
M. Then M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] ∧
¬[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])].
Trivially by definition 1.3 we get points 2 and 3:
2. M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] iff M,m/h |=
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] and M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]]
3. M,m/h |= ¬[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])] iff either M,m1/h1 |=
¬© ([β dstit : φ]∧ [β dstit : ψ]) for some m1 ≡αw m and for some h1 ∈ H(m1) (the
violation of the positive condition); orM,m2/h2 |=©([β dstit : φ]∧ [β dstit : ψ])
for every m2 ∈ i(m) and for every h2 ∈ H(m2) (the violation of the negative
condition).
From point 2 we infer:
4. M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] iff M,m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : φ] for every
m1 ≡αw m and for every h1 ∈ H(m1) (the positive condition) and M,m2/h2 |=
¬ © [β dstit : φ] for some m2 ∈ i(m) and for some h2 ∈ H(m2) (the negative
condition).
Note that what is stated in point 4 with respect to formula φ is true also regarding
ψ; so we get:
5. M,m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : ψ] for every m1 ≡αw m and for every h1 ∈ H(m1) and
M,m2/h2 |= ¬© [β dstit : ψ] for some m2 ∈ i(m) and for some h2 ∈ H(m2).
The violation of the positive condition in point 3 implies:
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6. M,m1/h⋆1 |= ¬([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ]) for some h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1), which in its
turn implies:
7. M,m1/h⋆1 |= ¬[β dstit : φ] for some h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1) orM,m1/h⋆1 |= ¬[β dstit : ψ]
for some h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1).
The first clause of point 7 contradicts the positive condition of point 4; the
second clause of point 7 contradicts the positive condition of point 5.
The violation of the negative condition in point 3 contradicts the negative con-
dition from point 4, or the negative condition from point 5.
Proposition 3.3. Formula 11 is not valid.
Proof. Take an arbitrary model M and an index m/h such that:
1. M,m/h |= [α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])] ∧ ¬[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]].
What is said is true iff: M,m/h |= [α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])] and
M,m/h |= ¬[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]].
The first conjunct from point 1 implies points 2 and 3.
2. M,m/h |= [α astit : ©([β dstit : φ]∧[β dstit : ψ])] iffM,m1/h1 |=©([β dstit : φ]∧
[β dstit : ψ]) for every m1 ≡αw m and for every h1 ∈ H(m1) (the positive condi-
tion);M,m2/h2 |= ¬© ([β dstit : φ]∧ [β dstit : ψ]) for some m2 ∈ i(m) and some
h2 ∈ H(m2) (the negative condition).
3. M,m1/h1 |= ©([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ]) for every m1 ≡αw m and for every
h1 ∈ H(m1) iff M,m1/h⋆1 |= [β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ] for every h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1).
The second conjunct from point 1 implies:
4. M,m/h |= ¬[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] iff either M,m1/h1 |= ¬© [β dstit : φ] for
some m1 ≡αw m and some h1 ∈ H(m1) (the violation of the positive condition)
or M,m2/h2 |= ©[β dstit : φ] for every m2 ∈ i(m) and every h2 ∈ H(m2) (the
violation of the negative condition).
Assume that the negative condition for the second conjunct from point 1 is violated.
Then, as it is stated in point 4, ©[β dstit : φ] is settled true at every moment
of a model M, what gives no contradiction neither the positive condition, nor
the negative condition for the first conjunct from point 1. That makes a model
M,m/h |= [α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ])] ∧ ¬[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]
consistent. Since it serves as a counter-model for formula 11, we state that formula
11 is not valid.
It is quite obvious that the lack of the parallelism between SDL and the given
fragment of stit-theory that focuses on the deontic effects of imperatives, turns out
to be a nice ground for rejecting some paradoxes of deontic logic, like McLaughlin’s
paradox or Ross’s paradox.
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Previously we stated that expression 5 pictures an imperative sentence. Now by
hypothesis we state that a conjunction of two imperatives can be captured in L either
with [α astit : © [β dstit : φ ∧ ψ]], or with [α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∧ [β dstit : ψ]).
However that may be one can mention that the complement of the first formula in
the pair can be derived from the complement of the second formula in accordance
with Principe C (Chellas 1992: 502). Thus we can conclude that if formula 11 is not
valid, and if [α astit : ©([β dstit : φ]∧[β dstit : ψ]) implies [α astit : ©[β dstit : φ∧ψ]],
then formula
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ ∧ ψ]]→
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] (12)
is not valid also.
Proposition 3.4. Formula 12 is not valid.
Proof. On the basis of proof 3.3 and Principle C.
In particular the invalidity of formulas 11 and 12 makes it clear why one cannot
proceed from the command to see to it that φ∧ψ to the command to see to it that φ.
For example, when a child receives from her parent the command “You ought to go
to the hospital and visit your grandmother”, she by no means receives the command
“You ought to go to the hospital and you ought to visit your grandmother”, and
thus she cannot eliminate the conjunction and finally get the commands “You ought
to go to the hospital” or “You ought to visit your grandmother”.
4 Indexed ought-sets for imperatives
The idea of indexed ought sets for stit-formulas comes from (Horty, Belnap 1995).
The suggestion is grounded on an observation that ideal histories usually differ with
respect to different agents, and so something which is ought to be for one agent may
be not within things obligated for the other. In general outline, to show that agents
α and β have Ought-sets that vary from each other, Belnap and Horty introduce
indexed ought sets Oughtα(m), Oughtβ(m), . . . and extend the language with indexed
operators ©α, ©β . . .
Then two kinds of restriction are imposed on stit-formulas with indexed ought-
operators: The first one says that these operators can be applied only to formulas
representing actions;11 the second forbids formulas like©α[β dstit : φ], where a stit-
formula for one agent is found within the scope of the ought-operator of the other
agent. The result of the second constraint is tedious: Indexed and non-indexed stit-
formulas represent the same class of valid formulas, as it is emphasized in (Horty,
Belnap 1995: 632).
11Strictly speaking, the same is true for non-indexed stit-formulas with the ought-operator too.
For example, formula [α dstit : © φ] turns out to be self-contradictory: It is not possible for its
subformula ©φ to be satisfied at some index m/h and not to be satisfied at some index m/h′, as it
is required by the negative condition for the whole formula.
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Nevertheless we expect to find some use of indexed Ought-sets if we abandon
the second constraint applied to Ought-set and thus get the possibility to use such
formulas as
©α [β dstit : φ] (13)
on the basis of the following definition:
Definition 4.1. M,m/h |= ©α[β dstit : φ] iff M,m/h⋆α |= [β dstit : φ], for every
history h⋆α ∈ Oughtα(m), where Oughtα(m) is the set of ideal histories with relation
to the agent α that go through the moment m.
Possible readings for formula 13 are: “It is obligatory for β in the face of α to
see to it that φ”; or “With relation to α it is obligatory for β to see to it that φ. A
command then can be captured with the help of the following formula:
[α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]]. (14)
4.1 The use of indexed ought-sets: commands
Earlier we demonstrated the favourable lack of parallelism between the SDL and
elaborated stit-logic for imperatives that shows itself in formula 11 which is not
valid in accordance with the semantics for astit, dstit and ©. In some instances
when we use non-indexed Ought-sets the parallelism continues holding, which may
drive us to some unwanted implications.
Consider the SDL theorem ©(©φ→ φ) and its stit-analog
© (©[α dstit : φ]→ [α dstit : φ]), (15)
which says that “it ought to be that an agent does what he ought to do” (Horty,
Belnap 1995: 624). Similary to what is said in formula 15, it might be the case that
it ought to be that an agent does what she ought to do after receiving a command
to do such and such. Thus it might be the case that formula
© ([α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]→ [β dstit : φ]) (16)
is unpleasantly valid.
Theorem 4.2. Formula 16 is valid.
Proof. Assume that it is not the case: M,m/h 2 ©([α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] →
[β dstit : φ]). Then there is a history h⋆ ∈ Ought(m) such thatm/h⋆ |= ¬([α astit : ©
[β dstit : φ]] → [β dstit : φ]). This is the case iff m/h⋆ |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]
and m/h⋆ |= ¬[β dstit : φ]. m/h⋆ |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] iff there is a moment
w < m such that for every moment m1 ≡αw m and for every history h1 ∈ H(m1)
m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : φ] (the positive condition) and for some moment m2 ∈ i(m)
and some history h2 ∈ H(m2) m2/h2 |= ¬ © [β dstit : φ] (the negative condition).
The positive condition says that ©[β dstit : φ] is settled true at every moment
m1 ≡αw m and at every history h1 ∈ H(m1), which means that ©[β dstit : φ] must
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be true at index m/h⋆ since h1 and h⋆ belongs to the same choice-cell Choiceαw(h⋆).
But at this index we also have formula ¬[β dstit : φ] that contradicts the fact that
m/h⋆ |= ©[β dstit : φ]. This refutes our assumption and proves that formula 16 is
really valid.12
Indexed ought-sets can help in escaping the validity of this kind and show that it
is not ought to be that agent β does some φ, that is ought to be done with relation
to agent α, whenever α performs an imperative action (a command) and by means
of this performance creates an obligation for agent β with relation to herself to do
φ. Putting this thing formally, we argue that regardless of the fact that formula 16
is valid, formula
© ([α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]]→ [β dstit : φ]) (17)
is not.
Proposition 4.3. Formula 17 is not valid.
Proof. Assume that it is the case. Then we get m/h⋆ |= [α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]]
and m/h⋆ |= ¬[β dstit : φ]. Then, exactly as in the previous argument, we have
m/h⋆ |=©α[β dstit : φ] for every h⋆ ∈ Ought(m). m/h⋆ |=©α[β dstit : φ] iffm/h⋆α |=
[β dstit : φ] for every h⋆α ∈ Oughtα(m). Note that those ideal histories h⋆ and h⋆α may
not coincide with each other and if it is the case no contradiction occurs between
formulas ©α[β dstit : φ] and ¬[β dstit : φ]. This makes formula ¬© ([α astit : ©α
[β dstit : φ]]→ [β dstit : φ]) satisfactory and thus formula 17 is not valid.
Another interesting point related to the indexed ought-sets reveals itself in the
situation when agents α and β produce the same imperatives (commands) that are
addressed to each other. Suppose that agent α says to agent β: “See to it that
φ!”, and suppose that α receives from β the same command, which means that α
and β want from each other to get similar outcomes and to make φ true in the
same index.13 It might be said that the formula that depicts such situation bears a
contradiction: Either because as a rule we implicitly keep in mind that α holds some
authoritative position in comparison with β, and so β cannot issue a command to
α; or because it is with a high probability ineffective to issue such a “symmetrical”
command, as it cannot be fulfilled by both agents at the same time. Nevertheless
it can be stated that formula
[α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [β astit : ©β [α dstit : φ] (18)
is satisfiable.
12Although formula 16 is valid, formula [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] → [β dstit : φ] is not. And it is
not possible to infer it from premises [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] →©[β dstit : φ] and©[β dstit : φ] →
[β dstit : φ], as the last premise is not valid. Note that the situation is similar to those in SDL,
where ©(©φ→ φ) is valid but ©φ→ φ is not valid.
13If we ignore the fact that “symmetrical” commands are wanted to be fulfilled by their authors
in the same index we get no conflict or contradiction between them: For example, α and β can
issue the command “Open the window!” addressed to each other without worrying about possible
contradiction if α wants β to fulfil the command on Monday, and β wants α to see to it what is
commanded on Tuesday.
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Proposition 4.4. Formula 18 is satisfiable.
Proof. Indeed it can be the case that
m/h |=©α[β dstit : φ] and m/h |=©β[α dstit : φ].
Then it can be that m/h⋆α |= [β dstit : φ] and m/h⋆β |= [α dstit : φ], where h⋆α ∈
Oughtα(m) and h⋆β ∈ Oughtβ(m). Seeing to it that φ then can be conceived as the
joint action of α and β preceded with a reciprocal imperative.
In order to step aside from such unnatural interpretation we put an idea that
formula 13 might not grasp some essential feature of the deontic effect of issuing
commands, which gives the possibility for formula 18 to be held. Here is a proposal
that serves to combat against the above situation with “symmetrical commands”.
Let the deontic situation for α and β that takes place after a command is issued
be depicted with formula
[α astit : (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ])], (19)
which says that when α issues a command she wishes β to fulfil what is commanded,
and at the same time she is not obligated to fulfil it by herself. If formula 19 depicts
commands properly (or at least in a more convenient way than formula 13 does),
then we can modify formula 18 in the following way:
[α astit : (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ])]∧
[β astit : (©β[α dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©β [β dstit : φ])]. (20)
Proposition 4.5. Formula 20 is not satisfiable.
Proof. Assume that M,m/h |= [α astit : (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ])] and
M,m/h |= [β astit : (©β[α dstit : φ] ∧ ¬ ©β [β dstit : φ])]. The positive condition
for these astit-formulas provides us with the following clauses:
1. M,m1 |= (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ]) for every m1 ≡αw m;
2. M,m1 |= (©β[α dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©β [β dstit : φ]) for every m1 ≡βw m.
These formulas settled true give the following clauses:
M,m1/h1 |=©α[β dstit : φ]
iff M,m1/h⋆α1 |= [β dstit : φ] for every h⋆α1 ∈ Oughtα(m1)
M,m1/h1 |=©β[α dstit : φ]
iff M,m1/h⋆β1 |= [α dstit : φ] for every h⋆β1 ∈ Oughtβ(m1)
M,m1/h1 |= ¬©α [α dstit : φ]
iff M,m1/h⋆α1 |= ¬[α dstit : φ] for some h⋆α1 ∈ Oughtα(m1)
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If histories h⋆α1 and h
⋆β
1 (each containing the outcome for commands
[α astit : (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ])]
and
[β astit : (©β[α dstit : φ] ∧ ¬©β [β dstit : φ])]
respectively) belong to different choice-cells in moment m1, then commands issued
by agents α and β are not “symmetrical”; if these histories belong to the same
choice-cell, then the contradiction between formulas [α dstit : φ] ([β dstit : φ]) and
¬[α dstit : φ] (¬[β dstit : φ]) reveals.
4.2 Indexed ought-sets meet promises
It seems quite natural to use indexed Ought-sets to distinguish commands from
promises. Whereas a command is depicted with formulas 5, 14, or formula 19, it
might be possible to picture promise with the help of the following formula:
[α astit : ©β [α dstit : φ]] (21)
what can be interpreted as an action of agent α who sees to it that she is obligated
in the face of agent β to see to it that φ. Further we can modify formula 21 in
order to express promises that an agent gives to herself: [α astit : ©α [α dstit : φ]].
For example, the promise of giving up smoking issued by an agent in her own face
would be a nice content for that.
One essential feature in acts of promising questions the acceptability of formula
21. The fact is that when agent α promises to do so and so in the face of agent
β, she does not simply create an obligation for herself in the face of agent β; most
probably agent α also creates an obligation to do so and so in her face also. We
can put this idea as follows: a promise to somebody is always a promise to yourself.
Promising in contrast to commanding doubles obligations. In order to express this
idea formally we propose
[α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : φ]] (22)
with the following possible reading: “Agent α sees to it that from the point of view
of agent β it is obligatory that from the point of view of agent α it is obligatory
that agent α sees to it that φ”.14
Conjecture 4.1. Formula 22 is satisfiable.
14Consider a conjecture: It is also possible to picture promise with a formula
[α astit : (©α[β dstit : φ] ∧ ©α[β dstit : φ])]. This formula says ultimately that it is obligatory
for α in the face of β to see to it that φ, while formula 22 says that it is obligatory for α in the face
of β to have an obligation to see to it that φ. Note that this allows to express in L+ different types
of promises: The first one needs to be fulfilled in a more exact way and so to say immediately, while
the latter is obligatory not in so strong manner.
214 Логико-философские штудии. Том 17 (№3), 2019
ЛОГИКА СЕГОДНЯ
In addition to the conjecture 4.1, formula
[α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : φ]]→ 3[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]] (23)
which expresses the fact that the promise implies the refraining ability for those
agents who give it, is valid.
Theorem 4.6. Formula 23 is valid.
Proof. Assume that agent α who promises φ to agent β has no ability to refrain
from seeing to it that φ. Then there must be a model M and an index m/h such
that:
1. M,m/h |= [α astit : ©β©α[α dstit : φ]] andM,m/h |= ¬3[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]].
2. M,m/h |= [α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : φ]] iff there is a moment w < m such that
M,m1 |=©β ©α [α dstit : φ] for every m1 ≡αw m (the positive condition).
3. M,m1/h1 |=©β©α [α dstit : φ] iffM,m1/h⋆β1 |=©α[α dstit : φ] for every h⋆β1 ∈
Oughtβ(m1).
4. M,m1/h⋆β1 |= ©α[α dstit : φ] iff M,m1/h⋆α1 |= [α dstit : φ] for every h⋆α1 ∈
Oughtα(m1).
5. M,m1/h⋆α1 |= [α dstit : φ] iffM,m1/h′1 |= φ for every history h′1 ∈ Choiceαm1(h⋆α1 )
(the positive condition) and M,m1/h′′1 2 φ for some history h′′1 ∈ Hm1 (the
negative condition).
6. M,m/h |= ¬3[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]] iff M,m/h |= ¬[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]].
Since m ≡αw m1, we have M,m1/h1 |= ¬[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]] as well.
7. M,m1/h1 |= ¬[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]] iff eitherM,m1/h′1 |= [α dstit : φ] for some
h′1 ∈ Choiceαm1(h1) or M,m1/h′′1 |= ¬[α dstit : φ] for every history h′′1 ∈ H(m1).
Note with respect to the first alternative that the formula [α dstit : φ] must
hold at some history in every choice-cell of the moment m1 since the formula
¬[α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]] is settled true at m1.15
8. Suppose the first alternative from point 7 takes place. Then there is no such
history h′′′1 ∈ H(m1) that M,m/h′′′1 |= ¬φ since every choice-cell contains history,
where [α dstit : φ] holds. This contradicts the negative condition of point 5.
9. The second alternative from point 7 contradicts positive condition from the point
5.
15Otherwise if there is some choice-cell K that contains no history, where [α dstit : φ] is true, we
must say that in K we have ¬[α dstit : φ] and thus, in combination with the fact that [α dstit : φ]
holds in some other choice-cell K′, in K we have [α dstit : ¬[α dstit : φ]], which contradicts clause 6
of the given proof.
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It is quite expected that in the case of commands the content of a command
might not be obligatory from the point of view of an agent who is commanded to
do so and so:
([α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]) ∧ ¬©β [β dstit : φ]. (24)
In order to reflect this situation in the formal framework we must suppose that
there is at least one choice-cell in an arbitrary frame S+, where agents α and β
share no ideal history. Otherwise, for every choice-cell Choiceβm(h) = h⋆α ∪ h⋆β that
belongs to the set of choice-cells with pairs of ideal histories for both agents α and
β, formulas [β dstit : φ] and ¬[β dstit : φ] must be satisfied, which makes formula 24
contradictory.
Situations with promises are essentially different: If an agent who is obligated
to do so and so does not consider herself as such, then the promise collapses in any
circumstances. Formula
([α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : φ]) ∧ ¬©α [α dstit : φ] (25)
that depicts this kind of situations on no conditions is satisfied.
Proposition 4.7. Formula 25 is not satisfiable.
Proof. To see it suppose that the first subformula of the astit-formula, formula
©β ©α [α dstit : φ], is settled true at moment m. Then at every history h⋆β ∈
Oughtβ(m) we have formula ©α[α dstit : φ], which reveals the contradiction, as we
also have formula ¬©α [α dstit : φ] settled true at moment m. Hence we conclude
that while it is possible for an agent to receive a command and still consider oneself
as not being obligated in her own face to see to it what is commanded, it is not
possible for an agent to give a promise and at the same time not to be obligated in
her own face to see to it what is promised.
5 The revival of imperative inference puzzles
Now we have at our disposal effective tools that can help to solve some intricate
puzzles which make difficulties for imperative logic to emerge. In the strict sense we
had already solved one of them when we proved that the conjunction of commands
“φ” and “ψ” does not imply command “φ” (see the proof of Proposition 3.3). This
result opposes to what was said in the famous article by Alf Ross on imperatives
(Ross 1944) (namely, in Ross’s notation: I(x ∧ y) implies I(x)) or in Daniel Van-
derveken’s proceeding on illocutionary logic (Vanderveken 1990) (where it is stated
that f(p ∧ q) “strongly entails” f(p) and f(q)).
Another thing that bothers researchers of imperatives is the fact that on the
basis of an indubitable validity “φ → (φ ∨ ψ)” it is possible to infer a command
to do “φ ∨ ψ” from a command to do “φ”. In 1995 Perloff proved that formula
[α astit : φ] → [α astit : φ ∨ ψ] is not valid. But this result, in spite of what is said
by its author, has still little in common either with imperatives regarded directly,
or with some of the essential effects they produce, and to a greater extend concerns
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agency and logic of action in general. Nevertheless we argue that there is a proof
that when agent α commands agent β to see to it that φ, and the usual deontic
situation then runs, she in no circumstances gives rise to the idea that a command
to see to it that φ or ψ has been done. In other words, we argue that formula
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]→ [α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∨ [β dstit : ψ])] (26)
is not valid.
Proposition 5.1. Formula 26 is not valid.
Proof. Take an arbitrary modelM and an index m/h such thatM,m/h |= [α astit :
© [β dstit : φ]] and M,m/h |= ¬[α astit : © ([β dstit : φ] ∨ [β dstit : ψ])].
M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] iff for every moment w < m M,m1/h1 |=
©[β dstit : φ] for every moment m1 ≡αw m and for every history h1 ∈ Hm and
M,m2/h2 |= ¬ © [β dstit : φ] for some moment m2 ∈ i(m) and some history
h2 ∈ H(m2). M,m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : φ] iff M,m1/h⋆1 |= [β dstit : φ] for every
history h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1). M,m2/h2 |= ¬© [β dstit : φ] iff M,m2/h⋆2 |= ¬[β dstit : φ]
for some history h⋆2 ∈ Ought(m2).
Suppose that the antecedent of the given formula is false in M at m/h because of
the violation of the negative condition. ThenM,m/h |= ¬[α astit : ©([β dstit : φ]∨
[β dstit : ψ])] iff M,m2/h2 |= ©([β dstit : φ] ∨ [β dstit : ψ]) for every moment m2 ∈
i(m) and for every history h2 ∈ H(m2). M,m2/h2 |=©([β dstit : φ] ∨ [β dstit : ψ]) iff
M,m2/h⋆2 |= [β dstit : φ] ∨ [β dstit : ψ] for some history h⋆2 ∈ Ought(m2).
There is no contradiction between formula ¬[β dstit : φ] and formula [β dstit : φ] ∨
[β dstit : ψ] which can be true in the same ideal history h⋆2 ∈ H(m2). Thus a coun-
termodel for formula 26 exists.
As we do not have the answer to the question about the best way of picturing
a disjunction of commands, we state another formula that serves as a variation of
Ross’s paradox:
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]]→ [α astit : © [β dstit : φ ∨ ψ]] (27)
Proposition 5.2. Formula 27 is not valid.
Proof. By analogy with proof of Proposition 5.1.
By means of formulas 5 and 22 we can also get an answer to the question about
the validity of modus ponens-like inference with respect to imperatives. One can
ask about whether it is possible to conclude that a command to do “ψ” holds on the
basis of a conjuncted command to do “φ” and to do “φ” if “ψ”.16 We argue that the
formula
([α astit : © (ψ → [β dstit : φ])] ∧ [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]])→
[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] (28)
is valid.
16Ross put this figure of a possible inference in imperative logic as follows: I(x) and I(x → y)
imply I(y). See paper (Ross 1944: 41).
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Theorem 5.3. Formula 28 is valid.
Proof. Take an arbitrary modelM and an index m/h such thatM,m/h |= [α astit :
©(ψ → [β dstit : φ])],M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] andM,m/h |= ¬[α astit :
© [β dstit : φ]].
1. M,m/h |= [α astit : © (ψ → [β dstit : φ])] iff there is a moment w < m such
that M,m1/h1 |= ©(ψ → [β dstit : φ]) for every moment m1 ≡αw m and for
every history h1 ∈ H(m1) (the positive condition) and M,m2/h2 |= ¬ © (ψ →
[β dstit : φ]) for some moment m2 ∈ i(m) and every history h2 ∈ H(m2) (the
negative condition).
As ©(ψ → [β dstit : φ]) holds at every m1 ≡αw m it must be the case that at
every index m1/h⋆1 such that h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1) there is ψ → [β dstit : φ].
As ¬© (ψ → [β dstit : φ]) holds at some index m2/h2 then there must be then
some index m2/h⋆2 such that h⋆2 ∈ Ought(m2), where formula ψ holds and formula
[β dstit : φ] does not hold.
2. M,m/h |= [α astit : © [β dstit : ψ]] iff there is a moment w < m such that
M,m1/h1 |= ©[β dstit : ψ] for every moment m1 ≡αw m and every history h1 ∈
H(m1) (the positive condition) andM,m2/h2 |= ¬©[β dstit : ψ] for some moment
m2 ∈ i(m) and some history h2 ∈ H(m2) (the negative condition).17
As ©[β dstit : ψ] holds at every moment m1 ≡αw m it must be the case that at
every ideal history which passes through moment m1 there is [β dstit : ψ]. In
particular, this fact holds with respect to the ideal history h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1).
3. Using clause 1 and clause 2 we can get at every ideal history h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1)
formulas ψ → [β dstit : φ] and [β dstit : ψ].
m1/h
⋆
1 |= [β dstit : ψ] iff m1/h⋆′1 |= ψ for every history h⋆′1 ∈ Choiceβm1(h⋆1) and
m1/h
⋆′′
1 2 ψ for some history h⋆′′1 ∈ H(m1). As ψ holds at index m1/h⋆′1 it holds
also at index m1/h⋆1, since histories h⋆1 and h⋆′1 belong to the same choice-cell
Choiceβm1(h
⋆
1). Then we can conclude that m1/h⋆1 |= ψ → [β dstit : φ] ∧ ψ. Then
in accordance with the modus ponens rule we getM,m1/h⋆1 |= [β dstit : φ]. Note
that this calculation relates to every ideal history that belongs to every moment
choice-equivalent for α and w to moment m.
4. M,m/h |= ¬[α astit : © [β dstit : φ]] iff for every moment w < m either
M,m1/h1 |= ¬© [β dstit : φ] for some moment m1 ≡αw m and for every history
h1 ∈ H(m1) (the violation of the positive condition) orM,m2/h2 |=©[β dstit : φ]
for every moment m2 ∈ i(m) and every history h2 ∈ H(m2) (the violation of the
negative condition).
If the violation of the positive condition occurs then there must be some ideal
history where ¬[β dstit : φ] holds. This contradicts the fact that at every ideal
17It is not necessary that formula ¬©(ψ → [β dstit : φ]) from clause 1 and formula ¬©[β dstit : ψ]
from clause 2 are quantified in the same index m2/h2 but it might be so. Even if ¬ © (ψ →
[β dstit : φ]) holds at some index m′2/h′2 it does not harm the proof.
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history h⋆1 ∈ Ought(m1) and at every m1 ≡αw m there must be [β dstit : φ] stated
in clause 3.
If the violation of the negative condition takes place then we must have [β dstit : φ]
at every ideal history h⋆2 ∈ H(m2).This contradicts the fact that that there must
be some history that goes through m2, where ¬[β dstit : φ] holds in accordance
with the negative condition from clause 1.
It is worth mentioning that even if in formula 28 the formula [α astit : ©
[β dstit : ψ]] is substituted with the formula [α astit : ψ] or formula [γ astit : ψ],
it does not violate the validity, as we still have formula “φ” satisfied with respect to
index m1/h1, for every moment m1 ≡αw m and every history h1 ∈ H(m1). Note that
the formula [α dstit : ψ] substituted as the second conjunct into the antecedent of
formula 28 does not preserve its validity, as it is possible that there is an indexm1/h1
such that m1/h1 2 [α dstit : ψ] while it is still the case that m/h |= [α dstit : ψ].
(This definitely happens because of the fact that choice-moments for agent α differ
concerning formulas [α astit : © (ψ → [β dstit : φ])] and [α dstit : ψ]: for the first
formula this is moment w, for the second formula, moment m). That is why the
“weakened” version of formula 28,
([α astit : © (ψ → [β dstit : φ])] ∧ [α astit : ψ])→ [α astit : © [β dstit : φ]], (29)
where ψ can be done by any agent—α, β or some other agent γ—might be accepted
as well.
Conjecture 5.1. Formula 29 is valid.
The same modus ponens-like validity might hold in case of promises:
([α astit : ©β ©α(ψ → [α dstit : φ]])] ∧ [α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : ψ]])→
[α astit : ©β ©α[α dstit : φ]]. (30)
Formula 30 says that if agent α promises in the face of agent β to see to it that
φ on condition that ψ holds, and if α promises in the face of β to see to it that ψ,
then she promises in the face of β to see to it that φ. On the whole, formulas 28
and 30 most probably behave identically:
Conjecture 5.2. Formula 30 is valid.
6 Concluding remarks
The following theorems reflect the main results of interpreting imperatives on BTS
via embedded stit-formulas with the ©-operator:
1. Theorems 3.1 and 4.6 demonstrate the refraining ability for an agent in case
of command and promise respectively;
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2. Theorem 3.2 demonstrates the validity of transition from two different com-
mands to the one command that associates their content under a singular
imperative operator;
3. Theorem 5.3, along with conjectures 5.1 and 5.2, shows the relevance of modus
ponens-like inferences with respect to commands as well as to promises;
4. Propositions 3.3 and 5.1 forbid some transitions usual for PL and SDL.
Secondly, we regard formulas 24 and 22 as an explication of the distinction between
a command and a promise, and formulas 19, 22 as expressing some of their essential
features.
Finally, we want to mention some curious questions that arise owing to the
usage of the formulas suggested in this article. First of all, it seems quite natural
to express different types of embedded imperatives by means of the given formulas.
For instance, the situation when an agent promises to give a command might be
pictured as follows:
[α astit : ©α©β([α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]])]. (31)
Moreover, this formula might be considered as a conclusion from the premises
[α astit : ©α (ψ → [β dstit : φ])] and [α astit : ©α©β[α dstit : ψ]], where the first
mentioned premise says that agent α commands β to see to it that φ on condition
that ψ holds, and the second premise says that α promises β that she is going to
see to it that ψ. Unfortunately, we immediately get into difficulties as soon as we
try to settle the truth definition for formulas with several astit-operators because
then an arbitrary frame contains several witness-moments, and their correlation
reveals contradiction, as it is shown in (Chellas 1992: 503–505) for the formula
[α astit : [β astit : φ]].
The second question arises mainly because of the usage of indexed Ought-sets.
Since we get an instrument that can moot the “transitive” properties of commands
and promises, it might be interesting to check, for instance, the validity of the
formula
([α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]] ∧ [β astit : ©α [γ dstit : φ]])→
[α astit : ©α [γ dstit : φ]], (32)
which says that the command to see to it that φ in the face of agent α given to agent
β by agent α, and then given (or transmitted) to agent γ by β, equals command to
see to it that φ in the face of α given to γ by α directly.
The third question touches upon the possibility of expressing permissions in
stit-theory, as permissions just like obligations are deontic consequences of per-
formed imperatives. A quick glance on the language of stit-theory and its seman-
tics suggests an idea that historical possibility operator 3 can be used in order to
express permissions granted from one agent to another. For instance, the formulas
[α astit : 3[β dstit : φ]] or [α astit : [α astit : 3[β dstit : φ]]] might be good candidates
for that.
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At last we find rather appealing the idea of a “shared” ideal history mentioned
at the end of subsection 4.2. Together with a certain class of frames such that at
each moment there are only two choice-cells, this idea can help to express some
intriguing features of an imperative agency. In particular, it is not possible for
formula [α astit : ©α [β dstit : φ]] to be satisfied on such class of frames when there
is no choice-cell that associates ideal histories h⋆α and h⋆β . This can be interpreted
as an unsuccessful command under the stipulation that β does not agree with what
is commanded by α.
All these items are subject of our particular concern in the course of the future
investigation of imperatives in the framework of stit-theory supplied with indexed
Oughts.
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